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Abstract
This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model
of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as
special cases rent seeking contests and policy con‡icts, where agents lobby
over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in
both models the grand coalition is the e¢cient coalition structure and agents
are always better o¤ in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition
structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in
the policy con‡ict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate
that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives
to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition
emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential
game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests. Journal of Economics
Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D72, D74. Keywords: secession, group
formation, rent seeking contests, policy con‡icts.
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1 Introduction
Why doesn’t universal peace prevail? The world is riddled with con‡icts:
states …ght over territories, …rms over markets, individuals over honors and
prizes, political parties and interest groups over policies. In each of these
situations, agents are willing to waste valuable resources in order to compete
while they could enter into an e¢cient peaceful agreement.
There is of course a distinguished literature in peace and con‡ict theory
(and its natural extension in economics– the rent seeking theory pioneered
by Tullock (1967)) whose objective is precisely to understand how con‡icts
emerge and can be resolved.1 The focus of the theory of rent seeking has
always been on the level of resources spent in contests. For example, in
a recent article, Esteban and Ray (1999) analyze how the total amount of
resources spent in contests depends on the distribution of a population with
heterogeneous characteristics. But while the theory of contests has been
extended in a number of directions, it is still almost silent on one important
issue: why do agents form groups, or engage in contests when they could
agree to a universal agreement?
Our objective in this paper is to shed light on this issue, by studying
the incentives to secede from a universal agreement and to form groups in
a general model of contest. More precisely, we consider the following set
of questions. Given that the e¢cient structure is universal peace, where
all agents form a single group to divide rents or choose policy, why do we
observe con‡ict among agents or groups of agents? Which agents have an
incentive to secede from the universal agreement? What conjectures should
they form on the reaction of other agents to make the secession pro…table?
Alternatively, if agents are initially isolated, what is the process by which
1For an introduction to con‡icts and collective action, see the classical book of Olson
(1965) and the book by Sandler (1992)).)
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they end up forming a single, e¢cient group?
To answer these questions, we rely on the recent noncooperative models
of coalition formation developed, among others, by Hart and Kurz (1983),
Bloch (1996), Yi (1997) and Ray and Vohra (1999) . (See Bloch (1997) for
a survey.) These models, which to the best of the knowledge have not yet
systematically been applied to the study of con‡icts, enable us to obtain
sharp, general conclusions on the viability of universal agreements and the
formation of groups. Another distinguishing feature of our approach is that
we consider a general model of con‡ict, which admits as special cases the
traditional rent-seeking model as well as models of policy con‡icts, where
interest groups located on a one-dimensional space lobby for the adoption
of a policy. Our analysis sheds light on the common structure of con‡ict
models as well as on the speci…c features of rent-seeking contests and policy
con‡icts.
Our analysis starts with a description of a general model of con‡ict,
adapted from Esteban and Ray (1999). In this model, we explicitly allow for
the formation of groups and the existence of external e¤ects across groups.
This general model encompasses as speci…c cases pure rent seeking (with
a collective or private divisible good), as well as policy con‡icts where the
choice of a policy by the winning group induces external e¤ects on all the
agents. Our …rst results show that the e¢cient coalition structure is always
the grand coalition, where no resources are wasted on con‡ict and agents
divide rents or choose policy inside a single group. While this result is well
known and obvious in the case of rent seeking, it is not immediately obtained
in the case of policy con‡ict, and requires some quali…cation. We show that,
as long as the utility loss is a convex function of the distance between an
agent’s ideal point and the policy chosen, universal agreement will always
be the e¢cient coalition structure in the model of policy con‡ict.
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Our study then focuses on the incentives to secede from the grand coali-
tion. For the rent seeking contests and policy con‡icts, we construct a
valuation, expressing the utility of every player in every coalition structure.
In the rent seeking model, this valuation can be explicitly computed while in
the policy con‡ict, we can only construct the valuation for a small number
of players. However, our analysis shows that, generally, the payo¤s obtained
by every player in a symmetric coalition structure is lower than the payo¤
obtained in the grand coalition. This result suggests that if agents want
to secede, they only have an incentive to do so if the resulting coalition
structure is asymmetric. In fact, we establish that a single player (in the
rent seeking contest) or a single extremist (in the policy con‡ict) always has
an incentive to secede when all other players form a single group. Hence, it
appears that individual players have no incentive to secede when their seces-
sion results in a complete collapse of the universal agreement (a symmetric
coalition structure where all groups are singletons), but are always willing
to secede when their secession is not followed by any additional change. We
formalize this observation, using the terminology introduced by Hart and
Kurz (1983). In the ° model (where a secession is followed by the collapse
of the group), the grand coalition is an equilibrium, whereas it is not an
equilibrium in the ± model (where after a secession, members of a group
remain together). In the rent seeking model, we are able to go one step
further, and endogenize the reaction of other players to a secession. Consid-
ering the sequential model of coalition formation proposed in Bloch (1996)
and Ray and Vohra (1999), we show that the grand coalition is indeed the
unique equilibrium outcome of the process of coalition formation.
While the previous results were obtained under the assumption that ev-
ery agent chooses noncooperatively the amount of resources spent in the
con‡ict, we also consider a cooperative model where members of a group
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coordinate their investments in the contest. Our main …nding is that in-
centives to secede are lower in the cooperative model, as seceding players
face a higher level of con‡ict than in the noncooperative model. In fact,
while an individual still has an incentive to secede in the cooperative rent
seeking contest when all other agents remain together, in the policy con‡ict,
an extremist no longer has an incentive to secede, once she knows that all
other agents will choose their outlays cooperatively in the remaining group.
Our paper draws its inspiration from recent studies by Esteban and Ray
(Esteban and Ray (1999), (2001a) and (2001b)). Esteban and Ray (1999)
introduce the general model of con‡ict that we use. Their analysis focuses on
the relation between distribution and the level of con‡ict, and shows that this
relation is nonmonotonic and usually quite complex. We encounter the same
complexity in our study, but focus our attention to a di¤erent problem: the
endogenous formation of groups in models of con‡icts. By simplifying their
model in some dimensions (considering a speci…c contest technology and
assuming that agents are uniformly distributed along the line in the policy
con‡ict), we are able to obtain new results on the incentives to secede and
form groups in models of con‡icts, thereby progressing on a research agenda
which is implicit in their analysis (Section 4.3.2 on group mergers in Esteban
and Ray (1999), pp. 396-397.) Esteban and Ray (2001b) study explicitly the
e¤ect of changes in group sizes in a model of rent seeking with increasing
marginal cost and prizes having both private and collective components.
Again, they focus their attention on the global level of con‡ict, and do not
discuss incentives to form groups or secede from the grand coalition.
In the rent-seeking literature, the issue of group and alliance formation
has received some attention since the early 80’s (See Tullock (1980), Katz,
Nitzan and Rosenberg (1991), Nitzan (1991), and the survey by Sandler
(1993).) The early literature treated groups and alliances as exogenous, and
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did not consider incentives to form groups in contests. Baik and Shogren
(1995), Baik and Lee (1997) and Baik and Lee (2001) obtain partial results
on group formation in rent seeking models with linear costs. They consider
a three-stage model, where players form groups, decide on a sharing rule,
and then choose noncooperatively the resources they spend on con‡ict. Baik
and Shogren (1995) analyze a situation where a single group faces isolated
players, Baik and Lee (1997) consider competition between two groups and
Baik and Lee (2001) analyze a general model with an arbitrary number of
groups. In all three models, it appears that the group formation model
leads to the formation of groups containing approximately one half of the
players. Our paper is closest to Baik and Lee (2001) because we consider
the formation of arbitrary groups. Our analysis di¤ers from theirs in two
important respects: we consider very di¤erent models of group formation,
where players can choose to exclude other players from the group (they
only consider open membership games), and we analyze a variety of models
of con‡icts, whereas they focus on a pure rent seeking model with linear
costs. A recent strand of the literature (Skaperdas (1998) and Tan and
Wang (1999)) analyzes the formation of alliances in models with continuing
con‡ict: once an alliance has won a contest, a new contest is played among
members of the winning alliance. Tan and Wang (1999) consider a general
model with asymmetric players, but suppose that the amount resources
spent of con‡ict is exogenous. Skaperdas (1998) allows for an endogenous
choice of …ghting expenses, but limits his analysis to three players. The
main distinction between these models and ours is that we only consider
one con‡ict: once a group has won the contest, either it obtains the right to
decide collectively on the policy, or it shares the prize between its members
according to a …xed sharing rule.
Finally, our analysis of policy con‡icts bears some resemblance to the
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study of country formation and secession in local public goods games. (Alesina
and Spolaore (1997) and Le Breton and Weber (2000).) As in these models,
we analyze incentives to form groups for agents located on a line and whose
utility depends on the distance between their location and the location of
the local public good (or policy). There are two important di¤erences be-
tween local public goods economies and policy con‡icts, which make the
comparison between the two models di¢cult to interpret. First, in local
public goods economies, it may be e¢cient to divide the population into
di¤erent groups (when the cost of providing the public good is low with
respect to the utility loss due to distances between the location of the agent
and of the public good), whereas in the policy con‡ict the grand coalition
is always e¢cient. Second, in local public goods economies, as agents do
not bene…t from public goods o¤ered outside their jurisdiction, there are no
externalities across groups, whereas in the policy con‡ict, an agent’s utility
depends on the entire coalition structure, as it determines both the location
of the policies and the winning probabilities of the di¤erent groups.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the model and preliminary results on the equilibrium of the games of con‡ict.
Section 3 focuses on rent seeking contests, and Section 4 discusses policy
con‡icts. Section 5 contains our conclusions and discussion of the limitations
of the analysis and future research.
2 A Model of Con‡icts and Contests
We borrow the model of con‡icts and contests from Esteban and Ray (1999),
and extend it to allow for the formation of groups of agents. This is a
general model encompassing as special cases the pure rent seeking contest
and con‡ict among lobbyists over the choice of social policies. We assume
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that there are n + 1 players, indexed by i = 0; 1; 2; :::; n. The set of all
players (with cardinality n+1) is denoted N . A coalition Cj is a nonempty
subset of N , and a coalition structure ¼ = fC1; C2; ::; Cmg is a partition of
the set of players into coalitions. Once a group of players Cj is formed, its
members spend e¤ort (or invest resources) in order to make the group win
the contest. We adopt the simple contest technology initially advocated by
Tullock (1967), and axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996). The probability that
group Cj wins is given by
pj =
P
i2Cj ri
R
;
where ri denotes the resources spent by agent i, and R =
P
i2N ri the total
amount of resources spent on con‡ict by all the agents. Resources are costly
to acquire, and each agent faces an identical quadratic cost function,
c(ri) =
1
2
r2i :
This speci…cation of the cost function di¤ers from the linear function
usually assumed in the rent seeking literature, and is adapted from the
general cost functions analyzed by Esteban and Ray (1999).2 We depart
from the usual linear speci…cation because, with heterogeneous agents and
groups, the cost function must satisfy c0(0) = 0 to guarantee the existence
of an interior equilibrium.
Upon winning the contest, the group Cj either obtains a …xed prize (in
the case of rent seeking contests) or the right to choose the policy imple-
mented for all agents (in the case of policy con‡icts). We denote by uij the
2Esteban and Ray (1999) conduct their analysis for cost functions satisfying c0(0) =
0; c0 > 0; c00 ¸ 0 and c000 ¸ 0. The quadratic cost is a special case of their general family
of cost functions.
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utility obtained by agent i when group Cj wins the contest. With all these
notations in mind, the utility of agent i can be written as
Ui =
mX
j=1
pjuij ¡ c(ri):
As in Esteban and Ray (1999), this formulation is general enough to cover
the case of pure rent seeking contests (where agents only derive positive
utility when their group wins the contest), and con‡icts (or contests with
externalities), where agents derive di¤erent utilities, when losing the contest,
according to the identity of the winning group. However, as opposed to
Esteban and Ray (1999), we do not suppose that all agents inside a group
obtain the same utility level, (uij may be di¤erent from ui0j for two agents
i and i0 in group Cj), nor that agents systematically favor the group they
belong to (uij may be smaller than uij0 for two disjoint coalitions Cj and
Cj0 where i 2 Cj): However, we will maintain Esteban and Ray (1999)’s
assumption that the total utility obtained by group Cj is higher when the
group wins than when any other group wins the contest, i.e.X
i2Cj
uij >
X
i2Cj
uik for all k 6= j
We distinguish between two models of interaction between members of
a group. In the noncooperative model, every agent chooses her contribution
ri individually. In the cooperative model, total contributions are chosen co-
operatively (and denoted Rj for the coalition Cj). Hence, in the cooperative
model, we can collapse the game into a game played by representatives of
each group, where each representative has a utility function given by
Uj =
mX
j=1
pj
X
i2Cj
uij ¡
X
i2Cj
c(ri):
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We start our analysis by deriving, for any coalition structure ¼, the
Nash equilibrium of the game of con‡ict and contest, where players choose
(either noncooperatively or cooperatively) the level of resources they spend
on con‡ict. It is easy to see that the cooperative con‡ict game is formally
identical to the game considered by Esteban and Ray (1999). Hence, we
refer to their Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 (Esteban and Ray (1999), p. 386) to
state:
Proposition 1 (Esteban and Ray (1999)). The cooperative game of con‡ict
admits a unique equilibrium (R¤1; R¤2; :::; R¤m); characterized by the interior
…rst order conditions:P
k 6=j Rk(
P
i2Cj uij ¡
P
i2Ck uik)
R2
=
Ri
jCij
Proof. See Esteban and Ray (1999). Our model is a special case of
their model, with a quadratic cost of acquiring con‡ict resources.
Using Proposition 1, we derive the indirect utility function of each agent
as
vi =
mX
j=1
R¤j
R¤
uij ¡ 1
2
R¤2j
jCjj2 :
This indirect utility function assigns to each coalition structure ¼ a vector
of payo¤s for all the agents. It enables players to evaluate the coalition
structures they form, and has been labeled a ”valuation” in the literature.
(See Hart and Kurz (1983) for an early example and Bloch (1997) for a
general discussion.) We denote this valuation by vCi (¼):
We now turn to the noncooperative game of con‡ict, which was not
considered by Esteban and Ray (1999), but retains close similarities with
the cooperative game. We obtain the …rst order condition:
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X
k 6=j
Rk
R2
(uij ¡ uik)¡ ri = 0: (1)
Notice that condition (1) does not guarantee that individual contribu-
tions to the contest will always be positive. If in fact,X
k 6=j
Rk(uij ¡ uik) < 0;
the agent will prefer to see her group lose, and will make negative contribu-
tions to the contest.3
Following the same lines as Esteban and Ray (1999), we can prove:
Proposition 2 The noncooperative game of con‡ict admits a unique Nash
equilibrium (r¤1; r¤2; :::; r¤n) characterized by the interior …rst order conditions::X
k 6=j
Rk
R2
(uij ¡ uik)¡ ri = 0:
Proof. To prove existence, note that the …rst order condition (1) de…ne
a unique best response of player i for all vectors of contributions (r¡i).
Furthermore, this best response is a continuous function of the contributions
(r¡i): As (uij ¡ uik) is …nite, condition (1) guarantees that ri is bounded
above by some positive real number R. Now consider the function ©i(r¡i)
de…ned over [0; R] by the …rst order conditions. Let © = £i©i:The function
© is a continuous map from a compact space into itself, and hence admits a
…xed point by Brouwer’s …xed point theorem. The …xed point of the function
© is clearly a Nash equilibrium of the game of the noncooperative game of
con‡ict.
3Negative contributions have to be understood as investments undermining the prob-
ability of success of the group. An alternative model could be considered, where players
make nonnegative contributions. The analysis and results would not be altered by placing
a positivity constraint on investments.
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To prove that the equilibrium is unique, suppose by contradiction that
there exist two equilibria r and r0. Without loss of generality, suppose that
R0 · R: Pick the index j for which the ratio pkp0k is maximal. Consider the
total contributions made by players in group Cj equilibrium r. A simple
summation of the individual …rst order conditions gives:
Rj =
1
R
X
i2Cj
X
k 6=j
(uij ¡ uik)pk
=
1
R
X
k 6=j
X
i2Cj
(uij ¡ uik)pk
As
P
i2Cj(uij¡uik) > 0; total contributions of group j are positive. Now
comparing total contributions made in the two equilibria r and r0 we obtain
Rj
R0j
=
R0
R
P
k 6=j
P
i2Cj (uij ¡ uik)pkP
k 6=j
P
i2Cj (uij ¡ uik)p0k
=
R0
R
P
k 6=j
P
i2Cj (uij ¡ uik)p0k(pk=p0k)P
k 6=j
P
i2Cj (uij ¡ uik)p0k
<
R0
R
pj
p0j
= (
R0
R
)2
Rj
R0j
· Rj
R0j
;
yielding a contradiction.
Again, we de…ne the valuation for each agent in the noncooperative
model as the indirect utility function
vNi (¼) =
mX
j=1
R¤j
R¤
uij ¡ r¤i
3 Rent Seeking Contests
In this Section, we analyze a …rst model of contest, where agents …ght over
a …xed prize V . The literature on group rent seeking discusses various
alternatives for the sharing of the prize among members of the winning
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group (see Nitzan (1991) and Baik and Shogren (1995)). Typically, one
considers a sharing rule which is a weighted combination of equal sharing
and sharing proportional to individual investments in the group. Equal
sharing induces group members to free-ride on the contribution of other
members, and results in lower investments in the contest ; proportional
sharing, on the other hand, induces a ”rat race” e¤ect, and results in higher
investments in the contest. While the role of various sharing rules and the
endogenous determination of the optimal rule have been emphasized in the
literature on group rent seeking, we focus in this paper on a di¤erent issue,
and simply assume that the prize is equally shared among members of the
winning group. Hence, the utility of an agent is given by
uij = V=jCjj if i 2 Cj;
uij = 0 if i =2 Cj:
In this simple group rent seeking model, it is well known that the e¢cient
coalition structure is the grand coalition. Formally, a coalition structure ¼
is e¢cient (in the cooperative or noncooperative sense) if there exists no
coalition structure ¼0 such that
P
i2N vi(¼
0) >
P
i2N vi(¼), where the valu-
ation v is de…ned respectively in the cooperative or noncooperative model.
We can state:
Lemma 3 In the rent seeking contest, the e¢cient coalition structure is the
grand coalition both in the noncooperative and cooperative models.
Proof. The proof is obvious. In the grand coalition, no resources are
dissipated and the sum of utilities is equal to the prize. Any model of
con‡ict (cooperative or noncooperative) with at least two groups results in
rent dissipation, and yields a smaller total payo¤.
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Our next result shows that the payo¤ received by any agent in a sym-
metric coalition structure is always lower than the payo¤ received in the
grand coalition. Formally, a coalition structure is symmetric if and only if
jCjj = jCkj for all groups Cj and Ck in ¼:
Lemma 4 In the rent seeking contest, both in the cooperative and nonco-
operative models, for any symmetric coalition structure ¼; vi(¼) < vi(fNg)
8i 2 N:
Proof. Consider …rst the rent seeking contest. In any regular coalition
structure withm groups of (n+1=m) players, the expected utility of a player
is:
V
m(n+ 1=m)
¡ c(ri) < V
n+ 1
:
Hence, any player gets a smaller payo¤ in a regular coalition structure than
in the grand coalition.
The intuition underlying Lemma 4 is easily grasped. In a symmetric
coalition structure, all agents are symmetric, and obtain the same expected
gain than in the grand coalition, but must also incur the cost of con‡ict.
While this Lemma is very simple, it will prove helpful in the analysis of
secession and group formation.
3.1 Valuations in rent seeking contests
We now derive explicitly the valuations in the noncooperative and cooper-
ative models of rent seeking contests. In the noncooperative model, we are
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able to derive an explicit analytical formula for the valuation. The interior
…rst order condition gives
V
jCj j
P
k 6=j Rk
R2
= ri 8i 2 Cj
Summing over all members of group Cj ;
V
P
k 6=j Rk
R2
= Rj:
Notice that this last expression is symmetric for all groups. Hence, in
equilibrium, every group will spend the same resources in the con‡ict, and
the winning probability is identical across groups. Straightforward compu-
tations then show that the total level of con‡ict and individual expenses can
be computed as:
R =
p
V (m¡ 1)
ri =
p
V (m¡ 1)
mjCj j
The valuation is thus given by
vNi (¼) = V f
1
mjCjj ¡
1
2
m¡ 1
m2jCj j2 g (2)
In the noncooperative model of rent seeking contest, the valuation thus
takes a particularly easy form. It only depends on the total number of
groups formed (m) and on the size of the group to which player i belongs
(jCjj). The valuation is independent of the size distribution of coalitions
to which the player does not belong, and of the total number of agents in
the society.4 We use the analytical expression to compute the valuation for
4This very simple expression is of course only obtained under very speci…c assumptions
on the contest technology, and would not obtain for alternative speci…cations. It is however
illustrative of the qualitative properties of the valuation in rent seeking contests. Notice
that a similar simple expression can be found in a very di¤erent context – cartel formation
in linear Cournot oligopolies studied in Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999).
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small numbers of players. (Tables only report the values for some of the
partitions. The values for partitions which can be obtained by permutation
of the players are not given here.)
Player/Coalition Structure 0 1 2
012 V=3 V=3 V=3
0j12 3V=8 7V=32 7V=32
0j1j2 2V=9 2V=9 2V=9
table 1: valuations for the noncooperative rent seeking
contest (3 players).
Player/Coalition Structure 0 1 2 3
0123 V=4 V=4 V=4 V=4
0j123 3V=8 11V=72 11V=72 11V=72
01j23 7V=32 7V=32 7V=32 7V=32
01j2j3 5V=36 5V=36 2V=9 2V=9
0j1j2j3 5V=32 5V=32 5V=32 5V=32
table 2: valuations for the noncooperative rent seeking
contest (4 players).
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate some important properties of the valuation.
First of all, it appears that the payo¤ a players receives in the grand coalition
is only dominated by the payo¤ she receives when she is an isolated player,
facing a group of size (n¡ 1). Any other coalition structure results in lower
payo¤s for all the players. Furthermore, it appears that the formation of a
group (or the merger between groups) always creates positive spillovers to
the other players. (As can be seen from the analytical expression for the
valuation, a decrease in the total number of groups m induces an increase
in the payo¤ for any player not a¤ected by the merger.) This positive
externality is the source of a free-riding problem, which leads any player
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to prefer to let the other players form groups. This free-riding problem is
highlighted by the fact that the only case where a player obtains a higher
payo¤ than in the grand coalition is when it faces a group formed by all the
other players.5
When players choose cooperatively their contributions, an analytical ex-
pression for the pure rent seeking contest cannot be obtained. Instead, we
compute below the valuation for small numbers of players
Player/Coalition Structure 0 1 2
012 V=3 V=3 V=3
0j12 0:29V 0:21V 0:21V
0j1j2 2V=9 2V=9 2V=9
table 3: valuations for the cooperative rent seeking contest
(3 players)
Player/Coalition Structure 0 1 2 3
0123 V=4 V=4 V=4 V=4
0j123 V=4 0:14V 0:14V 0:14V
01j23 0:19V 0:19V 0:19V 0:19V
01j2j3 0:16V 0:16V 0:18V 0:18V
0j1j2j3 5V=32 5V=32 5V=32 5V=32
table 4: valuation for the cooperative rent seeking contest (4
players)
Tables 3 and 4 show that the valuation in the cooperative model dis-
plays the same qualitative properties as the valuation in the noncooperative
5A similar free-riding problem appears in the study of cartel formation. The cartel
game is also a game with positive spillovers. See Bloch (1997) and Yi (1997) for a general
discussion of games with positive spillovers.
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model. In the cooperative model, the payo¤ received in the grand coali-
tion dominates the payo¤ received in any other coalition structure.(The two
payo¤s are equal when one agent faces a group of three other agents). One
can also check that, for a small number of players, the cooperative model
displays positive spillovers. Finally, the payo¤s are typically lower in the co-
operative model than in the noncooperative model. This observation (which
may seem counterintuitive at …rst glance) is due to the fact that the total
level of con‡ict is higher in the cooperative model, as members of a group
coordinate their choices of investments in contest, and do not face free-riding
from other group members.
3.2 Secession in rent seeking contests
Given that the e¢cient coalition structure is the grand coalition, we now an-
alyze under which conditions the grand coalition is immune to secession. Our
analysis will be centered around individual deviations, and we ask: When
does an individual agent have an incentive to leave the group and initiate a
contest? The previous tables show that the answer to this question depends
on the anticipated reaction of the other players to the initial secession. As
a …rst step, we analyze individual incentives to secede, with an exogenous
description of the reaction of other agents.
Borrowing from Hart and Kurz (1983), we de…ne two possible reactions
of the external players. In the ° model, the grand coalition dissolves, and
all the players become singletons. In the ± model, after the secession of a
player, all other players remain together in a complementary coalition.6 We
6 In Hart and Kurz (1983)’s original formulation, the ° and ± models were de…ned
in terms of noncooperative games of coalition formation. In the ° model, a coalition is
formed if all its members unanimously agree on the coalition ; in the ± model, a coalition
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thus say that the grand coalition is °¡immune to secession by player i if
vi(fNg) ¸ vi(ff0g; :::fngg: (As the valuations obtained by a player in the
grand coalition and in the coalition structure formed of singletons are identi-
cal in the cooperative and noncooperative models, we do not need to specify
the model we use in the ° case). The grand coalition is ±¡immune to seces-
sion by player i in the noncooperative (respectively cooperative) models if
vi(fNg) ¸ vNi (ffig;Nnfigg) (respectively vi(fNg) ¸ vCi (ffig;Nnfigg)
Proposition 5 In the rent seeking contest, the grand coalition is °¡immune
to secession for all the players. The grand coalition is not ±¡immune to se-
cession in the noncooperative model for n ¸ 2 and it is not ±-immune to
secession in the cooperative model for n ¸ 4:
Proof. In the ° model, Lemma 4 immediately shows that the value of
every player in a coalition structure formed of singletons is lower than in the
grand coalition.
In the ± model, for the noncooperative case, a direct computation gives
the value vNi (ffig; Nnfigg) = V (12 ¡ 18) = 3V8 > Vn+1 for n ¸ 2:
In the cooperative case, a simple computation shows that
vNi (ffig;Nnfigg) = V
2 +
p
n
2(1 +
p
n)2
>
V
n+ 1
for n ¸ 4:
Proposition 5 shows that the pro…tability of a secession depends on the
anticipated reaction of the other players. If the other players react by break-
ing into singletons, the deviation is not pro…table ; if, on the other hand,
is formed by all players who have announced the same coalition. A coalition structure is
then ° (respectively ±) immune to secession if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium outcome
of the ° (respectively ±) game of coalition formation.
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they react by staying into a single group, an individual deviation becomes
pro…table. Furthermore, payo¤s obtained in a cooperative contest are lower
than the payo¤s obtained in a noncooperative contest, so that the incentive
to secede is lower in the cooperative model.
3.3 Group formation in rent seeking contests
The analysis of the previous subsection relies on an exogenous speci…cation
of the behavior of players following a secession. We now turn to a group
formation model where the reaction of players to a secession is endogenized.
Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) propose a sequential model of coali-
tion formation, where every player acts optimally, anticipating the behavior
of subsequent players. This forward looking game of coalition formation
is formalized as follows. At each period t, one player is chosen to make a
proposal (a coalition to which it belongs), and all the prospective members
of the coalition respond in turn to the proposal. If the proposal is accepted
by all, the coalition is formed and another player is designated to make a
proposal at t + 1 ; if some of the players reject the proposal, the coalition
is not formed, and the …rst player to reject the o¤er makes a countero¤er
at period t + 1. The identity of the di¤erent proposers and the order of
response are given by an exogenous rule of order. There is no discounting in
the game but all players receive a zero payo¤ in case of an in…nite play. As
the game is a sequential game of complete information and in…nite horizon,
we use as a solution concept stationary perfect equilibria.
When players are ex ante identical, it can be shown that the coalition
structures generated by stationary perfect equilibria can also be obtained
by analyzing the following simple …nite game. The …rst player announces
an integer k1, corresponding to the size of the coalition she wants to see
formed, player k1 + 1 announces an integer k2, etc.;, until the total number
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n of players is exhausted. An equilibrium of the …nite game determines
a sequence of integers adding up to n, which completely characterizes the
coalition structure as all players are ex ante identical.
The characterization of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the
sequential game of group formation requires an explicit analytical expression
for the valuation, and hence can only be done in the noncooperative rent
seeking contest. We obtain
Proposition 6 In the rent seeking contest, the grand coalition is the unique
equilibrium coalition structure of the sequential game of coalition formation.
Proof. To prove the Proposition, we consider the …nite game of an-
nouncement of coalition sizes, and compute by backward induction the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The proof of the Proposition relies
on the following Lemma.
Lemma 7 Suppose that K ¸ 1 coalitions have been formed and that there
are j remaining players in the game, with j ¸ 2. Then player (n + 1 ¡ j)
optimally chooses to form a coalition of size 1 when she anticipates that all
subsequent players form singletons.
To prove the Lemma, we compute the payo¤ of player n + 1 ¡ j as
a function of the size ¹ of the coalition she forms, anticipating that all
subsequent j ¡ ¹ players form singletons.
F (¹) =
1
(K + j ¡ ¹+ 1)¹ ¡
1
2
K + j ¡ ¹
(K + j ¡ ¹+ 1)2¹2
Let a = K + j and de…ne
G(¹) =
F (¹)
F (1)
=
a2
£¡2¹2 + ¹(2a+ 3)¡ a¤
(a¡ ¹+ 1)2¹2 (a+ 1)
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and
h(¹) = (a¡ ¹+ 1)2¹2 (a+ 1)¡ a2 £¡2¹2 + ¹(2a+ 3)¡ a¤ :
We will show that h(¹) > 0 for all j ¸ ¹ > 1, thus establishing that the
optimal choice of player n+1¡ j is to choose a coalition of size 1. We …rst
note that h(1) = 0 and
h(j) = j[(j +
1
j
¡ 2)K3 + j (j ¡ 1) ¡K2 ¡ 1¢] > 0 as K ¸ 1 and j ¸ 2:
Next we compute
h0(¹) = 2(a+ 1) (a+ 1¡ ¹) (a+ 1¡ 2¹)¹¡ a2 [2a+ 3¡ 4¹]
and obtain
h0(1) = 2a(a¡ 2) ¸ 0 as a ¸ 2;
h0(j) = 2(K + 1¡ j)[(j ¡ 1)K2 + j2K + j)]¡ (K + j):
Finally, we compute the second derivative
h00(¹) = 2(a+ 1)[6¹2 ¡ 6¹(a+ 1) + (a+ 1)2] + 4a2
The second derivative h00 is a quadratic function, and the equation h00(x) = 0
admits two roots given by
x1 =
a+ 1
2
¡
p
¢; x2 =
a+ 1
2
+
p
¢
with ¢ = 48
h
(a+ 1)4 ¡ 4a2 (a+ 1)
i
23
We conclude that the function h0 is increasing over the interval [¡1; x1],
decreasing over the interval [x1; x2] and increasing over the interval [x2;+1]:
We now distinguish between two cases. If h0(j) < 0; as the function h0
is continuous over [1; j]; and h0(1) > 0 > h0(j), there exists a value x for
which h(x) = 0:We show that this value is unique. Suppose by contradiction
that h0(x) = 0 admits multiple roots over the interval [1; j]: As h0(1) > 0
and h0(j) < 0, there must exist at least three values y1 < y2 < y3 with
h0(y1) = h0(y2) = h0(y3) = 0 and h00(y1) < 0; h00(y2) > 0; h00(y3) < 0:
However, our earlier study of the second derivative established that there
exist no values satisfying these conditions. Hence, there exists a unique
root x¤of the equation h0(x) = 0 in the interval [1; j] and h0(x) ¸ 0 for all
x 2 [1; x¤]; h0(x) · 0 for all x 2 [x¤; j]. Hence, the function h attains its
minimum either at ¹ = 1 or ¹ = j and as h(j) > h(1) = 0; h(¹) > 0 for all
j ¸ ¹ > 1.
If now h0(j) > 0, we necessarily have j < K + 1: Hence, j < a+12 < x2.
In that case, we show that there is no value x 2 [1; j] for which h0(x) = 0:
Suppose by contradiction that the function crosses the horizontal axis. Then
there exists at least two values y1 < y2 < x2 for which h0(y1) = h0(y2) = 0
and h00(y1) < 0; h00(y2) > 0: Our earlier study of the second derivative h00
shows that there exist no values satisfying those conditions. Hence h0(¹) > 0
for all ¹ 2 [1; j] and as h(1) = 0; h(¹) > 0 for all j ¸ ¹ > 1, completing the
proof of the Lemma.
We now use the preceding Lemma to …nish the proof. We …rst claim
that, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, after any coalition has been formed,
all players choose to form singletons. The proof of this claim is obtained
by induction on the number j of remaining players. If j = 1, the result is
immediate. Suppose now that the induction hypothesis is true for all t < j.
By the induction hypothesis, in equilibrium, all players following player
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(n ¡ j + 1) form singletons. By the preceding Lemma, player (n ¡ j + 1)
optimally chooses to form a coalition of size 1.
Finally, consider the …rst player. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, she
knows that players form singletons after she moved. Hence, she computes
her expected pro…t as
F (¹) =
1
(n¡ ¹+ 2)¹ ¡
1
2
n¡ ¹+ 1
(n¡ ¹+ 2)2¹2
=
(n¡ ¹+ 1)(2¹¡ 1) + 2¹
2(n¡ ¹+ 2)2¹2 :
To show that F (¹) < F (n+ 1) for all ¹ < n+ 1, notice …rst that
n+ 1 · ¹(n¡ ¹+ 2);
as the left hand side of this inequality de…nes a concave function of ¹, which
is increasing until ¹ = n2 + 1, then decreasing and attains the values n+ 1
for ¹ = 1 and ¹ = n+ 1: We thus have:
(n¡ ¹+ 1)(2¹¡ 1) + 2¹
2(n¡ ¹+ 2)2¹2 ·
(n¡ ¹+ 1)(2¹¡ 1) + 2¹
2(n¡ ¹+ 2)¹(n+ 1)
<
2¹(n¡ ¹+ 2)
2(n¡ ¹+ 2)¹(n+ 1) =
1
n+ 1
;
establishing that the …rst player chooses to form the grand coalition.
4 Policy con‡icts
The second model we consider is a model of policy con‡ict inspired by Este-
ban and Ray (1999). In this model, agents lobby for a policy and each agent
receives utility from the policy chosen in the contest. We take the policy
space to be the segment [0; 1] and suppose that the n+1 are equally spaced
along the line. The location of agent i (which corresponds to the point i=n
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on the segment) represents her optimal policy. We suppose that agents have
Euclidean preferences and su¤er a loss from the choice of a policy di¤erent
from their bliss point. The primitive utility of agent i is thus a decreasing
function of the distance between the policy x and her ideal point i=n. More
precisely, we describe the primitive utility of agent i as
ui = V ¡ f(ji=n¡ xj);
where V denotes a common payo¤ for all agents, and f is a strictly
increasing and convex function of the distance between agent i and the
implemented policy x, with f(0) = 0.7
We restrict our attention to the formation of consecutive groups of
agents, i.e. groups which contain all the players in the interval [i; k] when-
ever they contain the two agents i and k. If a group Cj = [i; k] wins the
contest, we suppose that the policy chosen is at the mid-point of the interval
[i; k]:Whenever the group Cj contains an odd number of players, this point
is the policy chosen by the median voter. If the group Cj contains an even
number of players, this point can be understood as a random draw between
the optimal policies of the two middle voters.8 Furthermore, it is clear that
this policy choice is the one which maximizes the sum of payo¤s of all the
group members.
Hence, letting mj denote the midpoint of group Cj , the utility of an
agent i is given by
7 In some of the computations to follow, we will focus on linear utilities, and assume
that the function f is the identity.
8We are of course aware of the fact that, with an even number of group members, the
choice of this policy cannot be rationalized by a voting model. However, we have chosen
to make this assumption in order to keep the model simple, and allow us to derive results
independently of the fact that the number of agents is a group is odd or even.
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uij = V ¡ f(ji=n¡mj j):
The policy con‡ict is thus a contest model with externalities: the payo¤
of a losing agent depends on the identity of the winning group. An added
complexity of the model stems from the fact that agents are ex ante asym-
metric. It thus appears that policy con‡icts are much more complex to
analyze than rent seeking contests. However, in spite of these complexities,
we are able to obtain results which parallel the results obtained for the rent
seeking model. In particular, we can show:
Proposition 8 In the policy con‡ict, the e¢cient coalition structure is the
grand coalition both in the cooperative and noncooperative models..
Proof. The proof of the proposition amounts to showing that the sum
of utilities of all agents is higher in the grand coalition than in any e¢cient
structure and does not distinguish between the cooperative and noncooper-
ative cases. In fact, both in the cooperative and noncooperative cases, for
any coalition structure ¼;X
i
vi(¼) = nV ¡
X
i
X
j
pjf(ji=n¡mj j)¡
X
i
c(ri)
· nV ¡
X
i
X
j
pjf(ji=n¡mj j):
Now, reversing the order of summation,X
i
X
j
pjf(ji=n¡mj j) =
X
j
pj
X
i
f(ji=n¡mj j)
We will show that for any median midpoint mj ;X
i
f(ji=n¡mj j)¡
X
i
f(ji=n¡ 1=2j) ¸ 0;
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so the highest sum of utilities is obtained when the grand coalition is formed,
the policy chosen is 1=2 and no resources are dissipated in the con‡ict.
The computation of the sum of utilities depends on the parity of the car-
dinal of the coalition Cj and the total number of players, n+1: A straight-
forward computation shows thatX
i
f(ji=n¡mjj) =
X
i·mj
f(mj ¡ i=n) +
X
i¸mj
f(i=n¡mj)
=
mjX
t=1
f(t=n) +
n¡mjX
t=1
f(t=n) if jCjj is odd
=
mj¡1=2X
t=0
f(
2t+ 1
2n
) +
n¡1=2¡mjX
t=0
f(
2t+ 1
2n
) if jCjj is even.
Similarly,
X
i
f(ji=n¡ 1=2j) = 2
n=2X
t=1
f(t=n) if n is even
= 2
(n¡1)=2X
t=0
f(
2t+ 1
2n
) if n is odd.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that mj · 1=2: If jCjj and n+ 1 are
odd, we compute
X
i
f(ji=n¡mjj)¡
X
i
f(ji=n¡ 1=2j) = 0 if mj = 1=2
=
n¡nmjX
t=n=2+1
f(t=n)¡
n=2X
t=nmj+1
f(t=n) ¸ 0
if mj < 1=2
where the last inequality is obtained because f is increasing. If jCj j and
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n+ 1 are even, we obtainX
i
f(ji=n¡mjj)¡
X
i
f(ji=n¡ 1=2j) = 0 if mj = 1=2
=
n¡1=2¡nmjX
t=n=2+1=2
f(
2t+ 1
2n
)¡
n=2¡1=2X
t=nmj¡1=2
f(
2t+ 1
2n
) ¸ 0
if mj < 1=2:
Next suppose that jCjj is odd and n+1 is even. By convexity of the function
f;
2f(
2t+ 1
2n
) · f(t=n) + f((t+ 1)=n):
Hence,
2
(n¡1)=2X
t=0
f(
2t+ 1
2n
) · f(0) + 2
(n¡1)=2X
t=1
f(t=n) + f((n+ 1)=2n):
and as f(0) = 0;
X
i
f(ji¡ n=2j) · 2
(n¡1)=2X
t=1
f(t=n) + f((n+ 1)=2n)
As nmj is an integer and n=2 is not, the condition mj · 1=2 implies that
nmj · (n¡ 1)=2: Then,
X
i
f(ji=n¡mjj)¡
X
i
f(ji=n¡ 1=2j) ¸
nmjX
t=1
f(t=n) +
n¡nmjX
t=1
f(t=n)
¡2
(n¡1)=2X
t=1
f(t=n)¡ f((n+ 1)=2n)
= 0 if nmj = (n¡ 1)=2
=
n¡nmjX
t=(n+3)=2
f(t=n)¡
(n¡1)=2X
t=nmj+1
f(t=n) ¸ 0
if nmj < (n¡ 1)=2:
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Finally, suppose that jCj j is even and n + 1 is odd. By convexity of the
function f , for any t ¸ 1
2f(t=n) · f(2t¡ 1
2n
) + f(
2t+ 1
2n
):
Hence,
X
i
f(ji=n¡ 1=2j) = 2
n=2X
t=1
f(t=n) · f(0) + 2
n=2¡1X
t=0
f(
2t+ 1
2n
) + f((n+ 1)=2n)
= 2
n=2¡1X
t=0
f(
2t+ 1
2n
) + f((n+ 1)=2n):
As n=2 is an integer and nmj is not, the condition mj · 1=2 implies nmj ·
(n¡ 1)=2. Hence,
X
i
f(ji=n¡mjj)¡
X
i
f(ji=n¡ 1=2j) ¸
nmj¡1=2X
t=0
f(
2t+ 1
2n
) +
n¡1=2¡nmjX
t=0
f(
2t+ 1
2n
)
¡2
n=2¡1X
t=0
f(
2t+ 1
2n
)¡ f((n+ 1)=2n)
= 0 if nmj = (n¡ 1)=2
=
n¡1=2¡nmjX
t=n=2
f(
2t+ 1
2n
)¡
n=2¡1X
t=nmj¡1=2
f(
2t+ 1
2n
) ¸ 0
if nmj < (n¡ 1)=2
Proposition 8 shows that the grand coalition is also the e¢cient struc-
ture in the policy con‡ict game. A careful reading of the proof shows that
this result is independent of the contest technology, and only relies on the
convexity of the distance function. Because the distance function is convex,
the sum of utility losses incurred by the agents is minimized when the grand
coalition is formed, and the policy 1=2 is chosen with certainty.
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The next Proposition parallels Lemma 4 and shows that every player
obtains a lower payo¤ in a symmetric coalition structure than in the grand
coalition. Given that players are ex ante asymmetric, we de…ne a symmetric
coalition structure as a partition which is symmetric around the point 1=2.
Formally, a coalition structure ¼ is symmetric if, whenever two players i and
j belong to the same coalition in ¼; players n ¡ i and n¡ j also belong to
the same coalition in ¼:
Proposition 9 In the policy con‡ict, both in the cooperative and nonco-
operative models, for any symmetric coalition structure ¼; vi(¼) < vi(fNg)
8i 2 N:
Proof. For a symmetric coalition structure, consider the coalitions to
the left of 1=2, C1; :::; CJ ; and let p1; ::; pJ denote the winning probabilities
of the corresponding groups. We distinguish between two cases. (i) If CJ
contains players to the right of 1=2, there are in total 2J ¡ 1 coalitions in
¼, 2
PJ¡1
j=1 pj + pJ = 1; and the coalition CJ is centered around 1=2 (ii) If
CJ does not contain any player to the right of the 1=2, then there are 2J
coalitions in ¼ and 2
PJ
j=1 pj = 1: In both cases, we compute the payo¤
of any player i · n=2 in the coalition structure ¼: It turns out that the
computation does not rely on a speci…cation of the resources spent in rent
seeking and hence is identical in the cooperative and noncooperative cases.
Case (i) vi(¼) = V ¡
PJ¡1
j=1 pj(f(ji=n¡mj j)+f(1¡mj¡i=n))¡pJf(1=2¡
i=n)¡ c(ri): Now, if i=n · mj; by convexity of the function f ,
f(mj ¡ i=n) + f(1¡mj ¡ i=n) ¸ 2f(1=2¡ i=n):
If i=n ¸ mj, by convexity of the function f ,
f(i=n¡mj) + f(1¡mj ¡ i=n) ¸ 2f(1=2¡mj) ¸ 2f(1=2¡ i=n):
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Hence,
vi(¼) · V ¡ 2
J¡1X
j=1
pjf(1=2¡ i=n)¡ pJf(1=2¡ i=n)¡ c(ri):
As 2
PJ¡1
j=1 pj + pJ = 1;
vi(¼) · V ¡ f(1=2¡ i=n)¡ c(ri) < V ¡ f(1=2¡ i=n) = vi(fNg):
Case (ii). By a similar computation, we obtain:
vi(¼) · V ¡ 2
JX
j=1
pjf(1=2¡ i=n)¡ c(ri) = V ¡ f(1=2¡ i=n)¡ c(ri)
< V ¡ f(1=2¡ i=n) = vi(fNg):
Proposition 9 again is independent of the contest technology and only
relies on the convexity of the distance function. The proof of the Proposi-
tion exploits the fact that, in a symmetric coalition structure, the winning
probabilities of two coalitions which are symmetric around 1=2 are equal.
Hence, for any player i, the expected distance to the chosen policy point is
equal to ji=n¡1=2j: However, since the distance function is convex, the total
utility loss is necessarily at least as large as the loss incurred in the grand
coalition where the policy 1=2 is chosen with certainty.
4.1 Valuations in policy con‡icts
We now turn to a computation of the valuation for the policy con‡ict. Not
surprisingly, we have been unable to obtain an analytical expression for
the valuation, and derive below the valuations in the noncooperative policy
con‡ict for 3 and 4 players and linear utilities. Again, we have omitted from
the tables those coalition structures which can be obtained by a permutation
of the agents.
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Player/Coalition Structure 0 1 2
012 V ¡ 0:5 V V ¡ 0:5
0j12 V ¡ 0:49 V ¡ 0:37 V ¡ 0:74
0j1j2 V ¡ 0:59 V ¡ 0:41 V ¡ 0:59
table 5: valuation for the noncooperative policy conflict, (3
players)
Player/Coalition Structure 0 1 2 3
0123 V ¡ 0:5 V ¡ 0:167 V ¡ 0:167 V ¡ 0:5
0j123 V ¡ 0:47 V ¡ 0:33 V ¡ 0:32 V ¡ 0:65
01j23 V ¡ 0:55 V ¡ 0:34 V ¡ 0:34 V ¡ 0:55
01j2j3 V ¡ 0:61 V ¡ 0:38 V ¡ 0:36 V ¡ 0:51
0j12j3 V ¡ 0:58 V ¡ 0:41 V ¡ 0:41 V ¡ 0:58
0j1j2j3 V ¡ 0:57 V ¡ 0:40 V ¡ 0:40 V ¡ 0:57
table 6: valuation for the noncooperative policy conflict, (4
players)
Tables 5 and 6 clearly demonstrate the complexity of the structure of the
valuation in the policy con‡ict. It appears that, as in the case of the rent
seeking contest, the only case where an agent obtains a higher payo¤ than
in the grand coalition is when an extremist individual breaks away from the
grand coalition while all other players remain together. Furthermore, notice
that the spillovers due to the formation of a group are either positive or
negative depending on the coalition structure. In the four player case, when
players 0 and 1 have formed a group, they obtain a higher payo¤ when 2
and 3 merge than when 2 and 3 are independent agents. On the other hand,
it turns out that player 0 obtains a higher payo¤ in the coalition structure
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0j1j2j3 than in the coalition structure 0j12j3. There does not seem to be
any regularity in the direction of externalities induced by mergers between
groups of agents!
Player/Coalition Structure 0 1 2
012 V ¡ 0:5 V V ¡ 0:5
0j12 V ¡ 0:55 V ¡ 0:405 V ¡ 0:595
0j1j2 V ¡ 0:59 V ¡ 0:41 V ¡ 0:59
table 7: valuation for the cooperative policy conflict, (3
players)
Player/Coalition Structure 0 1 2 3
0123 V ¡ 0:5 V ¡ 0:167 V ¡ 0:167 V ¡ 0:5
0j123 V ¡ 0:54 V ¡ 0:38 V ¡ 0:24 V ¡ 0:57
01j23 V ¡ 0:56 V ¡ 0:39 V ¡ 0:39 V ¡ 0:56
01j2j3 V ¡ 0:56 V ¡ 0:40 V ¡ 0:39 V ¡ 0:58
0j12j3 V ¡ 0:57 V ¡ 0:40 V ¡ 0:40 V ¡ 0:57
0j1j2j3 V ¡ 0:57 V ¡ 0:40 V ¡ 0:40 V ¡ 0:57
table 8: valuation for the cooperative policy conflict (4
players)
Tables 7 and 8 again illustrate the complexity of the valuation in the
policy con‡ict, which does not seem to display any regularity. Notice that,
as opposed to the noncooperative case, the grand coalition dominates all
coalition structures: an extremist never bene…ts from breaking away. A
comparison between Tables 6 and 8 shows that agents do not necessarily
bene…t from choosing their resources collectively. This is due to the fact
that we do not allow transfers among agents in a group. Hence, even though
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agents collectively bene…t from cooperating in their choices of investment,
some agents may end up with a lower utility in the cooperative model.
4.2 Secession in policy con‡icts
As in the rent seeking contests, we now investigate whether the grand coali-
tion is immune to secession in the policy con‡icts.
Proposition 10 In the policy con‡ict, the grand coalition is °¡immune
to secession for all the players. The grand coalition is not ±¡immune to
secession by an extremist player in the noncooperative model with linear
utilities for n ¸ 2: However, the grand coalition is ±¡immune to secession
by an extremist player in the cooperative model with linear utilities.
Proof. The fact that the grand coalition is ° immune to secession is
a direct consequence of Proposition 9, as the coalition structure formed of
singletons is symmetric.
To show that an extremist bene…ts from breaking away in the noncoop-
erative model with linear utilities, we compute the equilibrium payo¤s. Let
C denote the coalition f1; ::; ng: We denote by r0 the equilibrium invest-
ment of agent 0 and by RC the total equilibrium investments of group C:
The distance between 0 and the midpoint of C is n+12n . Hence the …rst order
condition for player 0 is:
n+ 1
2n
RC
R2
= r0:
Now consider players in C. As long as i · n+14 , player i prefers the policy
choice of player 0 to the policy choice of the coalition C and contributes a
negative amount:
ri =
r0
R2
(4i¡ (n+ 1))
2n
:
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For n+14 · i · n+12 , player i contributes a positive amount:
ri =
(4i¡ (n+ 1))
2n
r0
R2
:
For players to the right of n+12 ; the di¤erence in distances is
(
n+ 1
2n
)¡ i
n
+
i
n
=
n+ 1
2n
;
and the contribution is given by the …rst order condition
n+ 1
2n
r0
R2
= ri:
Let rC denote the solution to this last equation. Then
RC =
X
i>0
ri = rc(Cardfi; i > n+ 1
2
g+
X
1·i·n+1
2
4i¡ (n+ 1)
n+ 1
):
We de…ne
A(n) = Cardfi; i > n+ 1
2
g+
X
1·i·n+1
2
4i¡ (n+ 1)
n+ 1
;
and the Nash equilibrium of the game of individual contributions can be
obtained by solving the system of two equations:
rcA(n)
R2
n+ 1
2n
= r0; (3)
r0
R2
n+ 1
2n
= rc: (4)
Dividing the two equations, we obtain r0 =
p
A(n) rc, and equation 3 yields:
r20 =
n+ 1
2n
p
A(n)
(1 +
p
A(n))2
:
Hence,
U0 = V ¡
p
A(n)
1 +
p
A(n)
n+ 1
2n
¡ n+ 1
4n
p
A(n)
(1 +
p
A(n))2
= V ¡ n+ 1
2n
p
A(n)(3 + 2
p
A(n))
2(1 +
p
A(n))2
:
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To show that player 0 obtains a higher pro…t than in the grand coalition, it
thus su¢ces to show
n+ 1
2n
p
A(n)(3 + 2
p
A(n))
2(1 +
p
A(n))2
<
1
2
: (5)
Inequality 5 is equivalent to
¡2A(n) + (n¡ 3)
p
A(n) + 2n > 0:
As A(n) < n, this inequality is always satis…ed for n ¸ 3: A direct compu-
tation (Table 5) shows that the inequality is also satis…ed for n = 2:
In the cooperative model, two cases must be considered according to the
parity of the number of elements in the set C = f1; :::; ng: The …rst order
condition for the extremist remains
RC
R2
n+ 1
2n
= r0
If n is odd, the …rst order condition for the complement coalition is
r0
R2
(n+ 1)2
4n
=
RC
n
and if n is even,
r0
R2
n+ 2
4
=
RC
n
In the latter case,
r0 =
(2(n+ 1)(n+ 2))
1
4p
2(n+ 1) + n
p
(n+ 2)
r
n+ 1
2
R =
1
2
(2(n+ 1)(n+ 2))
1
4
and the individual payo¤ is
ue0 = V ¡
n+ 1
4
3
p
2(n+ 1)(n+ 2) + 2n(n+ 2)
(
p
2(n+ 1) + n
p
(n+ 2))2
:
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When n is odd, an analogous computation shows:
uo0 = V ¡
n+ 1
4n
3
p
2n(n+ 1) + 2n(n+ 1)
(
p
2 +
p
n(n+ 1))2
It can be checked that
uo0 < x0 ,
n+ 1
4n
3
p
2n(n+ 1) + 2n(n+ 1)
(
p
2 +
p
n(n+ 1))2
>
1
2
, (3¡ n)
p
(n+ 1) +
p
2n(n¡ 1) > 0
The latter expression is increasing in n and positive for n = 1: Hence it
is always positive. In the even case
ue0 < x0 ,
n+ 1
4
3
p
2(n+ 1)(n+ 2) + 2n(n+ 2)
(
p
2(n+ 1) + n
p
(n+ 2))2
>
1
2
, (3¡ n)
p
(n+ 1)(n+ 2) +
p
2(n2 ¡ 2) > 0
(6)
Again the last term is increasing in n and positive for n = 2:We conclude
that an extremist never has an incentive to break away from the grand
coalition in the cooperative model.
Proposition 9 establishes a close parallel between incentives to secede in
rent seeking contests and policy con‡icts. An extremist agent has an incen-
tive to secede in the noncooperative policy con‡ict only when she anticipates
that all other agents remain in a single group (the ± model). If she believes
that her secession will lead to a dissolution of the group, an extremist agent
has no incentive to break away from the grand coalition. Interestingly, in the
cooperative policy con‡ict, an extremist agent does not have an incentive to
secede from the grand coalition, even when all other agents remain together.
This result is due to the fact that, by cooperating inside a group, all other
agents are able to increase the amount of resources spent on the contest, so
that the payo¤ of a seceding extremist is always lower in the cooperative
model than in the noncooperative model. Finally, note that we have been
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unable to characterize the incentives to secede by agents who are not at the
extreme points of the segment. While we strongly believe that these agents
have less incentive to secede than extremists, we have not been able to prove
it formally.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of
contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as
special cases rent seeking contests and policy con‡icts, where agents lobby
over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that
in both models the grand coalition is the e¢cient coalition structure and
that agents are always better o¤ in the grand coalition than in a symmetric
coalition structure. As a consequence, individual agents only have an in-
centive to secede if their secession results in an asymmetric structure. We
show that individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in
the policy con‡ict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate
that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Further-
more, if group members choose cooperatively their investments in con‡ict,
incentives to secede are lower. In the policy con‡ict, an extremist never has
an incentive to secede when she faces a group of agents coordinating the
amount they spend in the con‡ict.
We should stress that our analysis su¤ers from severe limitations. We
have only considered individual incentives to secede, and do not consider
joint secessions by groups of agents. This focus on individual deviations
is motivated by the analysis of valuations with small numbers of players,
where it appears that the most favorable cases for secessions are secessions
by individual players (in the rent seeking contest) or individual extremists
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(in the policy con‡ict). However, a complete analysis of group secessions
is still needed to analyze the stability of the grand coalition. We have also
limited our analysis by forbidding transfers across group members. Allowing
for transfers in a model with individual secessions can only bias the analy-
sis in favor of the grand coalition, as the grand coalition could implement
a transfer scheme to prevent deviations by individuals. In a model with
group secession, the e¤ect of transfers is less transparent, as transfers would
simultaneously increase the set of feasible utility allocations in the grand
coalition and in deviating groups. This is an issue that we plan to tackle in
future research.
Finally, the main …ndings of our analysis leave us somewhat dissatis…ed.
We have found that the grand coalition is surprisingly resilient. In the
rent seeking contest, it is the only outcome of a natural procedure of group
formation. In the policy con‡ict, the grand coalition is immune to secession
when group members coordinate their choice of investments. This suggests
that the level of con‡ict, and the formation of groups and alliances that we
observe in reality cannot be justi…ed purely on strategic grounds. In order
to explain con‡ict, we probably need to resort to other elements – group
identity, ethnic belonging– which are not easily incorporated in an economic
model.
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